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Narrating crises and populism 





The aim of this article is to propose an exploratory critical response to the two following 
main research questions: (1) why, in moments of crises, particular metaphors operate in the 
construction of interrelated cultural narratives; and (2) in which ways metaphors generate 
alternative intellectual horizons for social renewal under the rise of populism in the Southern 
European context. A metaphor is not only a linguistic device but also a cognitive operation 
that configures and shapes the pre-figurative poetic acts which articulate our worldviews. It is 
my working hypothesis that by studying the metaphorical systematicity produced within certain 
imagined communities, it is possible to ground the conceptual system that informs cultural and 
political practices such as populist movements, while also tracing novel metaphors that can activate 
renewal and produce structural change in our societies. In this essay, I propose to critically define 
such conceptual systems as ‘regimes of metaphor’.
Keywords
crisis and populism, cultural narratives, metaphor theory, regimes of metaphor, Southern 
Europe
Introduction: research questions; theoretical limitations of 
On Populist Reason; why metaphors
Research questions
The aim of this article is to propose an exploratory critical response to the two follow-
ing main research questions: (1) why, in moments of crisis, do particular metaphors 
operate in the construction of interrelated cultural narratives?; and (2) in what ways do 
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metaphors generate alternative intellectual horizons for social renewal under the rise 
of populism in the Southern European context?
On Populist Reason: theoretical limitations
In order to achieve this goal, I will briefly review the latest developments in Critical and 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory in connection with my working hypothesis on what I have 
defined as ‘regimes of metaphor’ within the context of the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, 
its aftermath and the rise of cultural politics of populism. Despite the growing number of 
scholarly studies on the conceptualization of populism from a political theoretical per-
spective, we are missing an in-depth study on the metaphorical systematicity produced 
within certain imagined communities,1 in order to ground conceptual systems that inform 
cultural and political practices which produce structural changes in our societies. It 
would be ill-argued to suggest that Laclau’s work On Populist Reason (2005) has already 
filled this gap in the scholarship. It is important to highlight that Laclau understood pop-
ulism as a ‘way of constructing the political’ (2005: 11) and ‘a political logic’ (2005: 
117), and he approached the phenomenon from an angle that did not consider cultural 
rhetoric (Pujante, 2017),2 neuroscience (Damasio, 2018) and important developments in 
social sciences (Mudde and Rovira, 2017; Müller, 2016; Rensmann, 2017; Wodak, 2015) 
concerning the cognitive configurations of our mind, our public sphere and our cultural 
systems (Pujante, 2017: 53). Instead, Laclau engaged with a critical corpus focused too 
closely on certain nineteenth-century conceptions of the nation and popular sovereignty 
that are not necessarily applicable to the twenty-first-century context, which features 
new and expanding modes of political, economic and cultural globalization. It is not my 
intention here to comprehensively critique On Populist Reason but to acknowledge some 
of the theoretical limitations of Laclau’s work.
Due to the uncritical acceptance of Laclau’s ideas in certain academic contexts, I 
would like to point the reader to a couple of major flaws in Laclau’s work converging 
around the category of ‘people’ (a key notion in studies on populism). Firstly, Laclau 
explains that the notion of ‘people’ is articulated under a ‘nominal’ and not ‘concep-
tual’ level. In this vein, Laclau also affirms that there are other empty signifiers, such 
as ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, which do not hold logico-conceptual connections 
but attributive-performative ones. From my point of view, this is a problematic and 
very debatable point because Laclau neglects the role of individual agency in the pre-
figurative poetic act of communication (Pujante, 2017) and meaning processing. 
Following his line of reasoning, Laclau elaborates that notions such as ‘justice’ or 
‘freedom’ do not hold a pre-relational and pre-narrative mental configuration. Laclau’s 
view leads to a conceptual contradiction: if a subject does not comprise a pre-relational 
and pre-narrative mental configuration, then he/she is not able to operate the set of 
meaning expectations that make communication possible between different actors. 
However, the reality is that actors do exchange information in a collaborative, net-
working and relational way, as we see in our everyday social, cultural and political 
arena. This is possible because of the interrelation of four rhetorical cognitive mecha-
nisms in the pre-figurative poetic act of creating meaning: metaphor, metonymy, syn-
ecdoche and irony.3
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Secondly, Laclau’s analysis is connected to the existence of so-called chains of equiv-
alence that orientate the signifiers’ informational processing. The key issue in order to 
activate social mobilization, according to Laclau, was (a) to intervene in the production 
of chains of equivalence and (b) to fill empty terms with meaning that have the potential 
to be instrumentalized by any actor on the political spectrum. This is why, in Laclau’s 
view, ‘populism’ overcomes the traditional divide between left- and right-wing political 
parties. In actual fact, this assertion allows Laclau to strategically move the academic 
discussion from discourse analysis to the performative and political possibilities of good 
versus bad populism. Such false dichotomies open up the ground, at the same time, for 
an understanding of ‘populism’ which remains largely uncritical of the fictional modes 
deployed to ensure cultural and political hegemony of any sort. Thus, a self-claimed 
‘eliteless’ elite (good populism) could articulate cognitive metonymic modes of becom-
ing by claiming to be part of the ‘people’ in an assertively ‘positive’ manner. One exam-
ple of this is the famous statement of Donald Trump, after being implicated in several 
scandals by major media actors in the USA, that ‘news media are the enemy of the peo-
ple’ (Wootson, 2018). Trump employs a powerful bi-directional inferred metonymy: he 
positively projects himself as the people and the people metonymically identify with 
Trump. Therefore, any questioning of Trump’s political actions immediately becomes a 
questioning of the will of the people.
Consequently, as this example concisely illustrates, political expression is the result of 
cognitive operations4 which involve complex processes of informational, rhetoric and 
experiential narrative configurations. Where Laclau can only consider the individual 
through its potential to be activated as a cultural-political collective self in a given nation-
state symbolic realm, I argue that there is a more entangled net of symbolic construction 
processes connected to psycho-emotional modes of individual-collective becoming under 
what Marco Caracciolo has brilliantly defined as ‘consciousness-enactment’ (2014: 11). 
Caracciolo emphasizes the ‘experientiality of narrative’, where the subject experiences 
the first person’s ongoing tension with the second and third attribution to a fictional being 
(2014: 111): the abstract negotiates and orientates the performative. The ‘consciousness-
enactment’ approach sheds a different light on Laclau’s rather biased explanation of the 
semantic capital of terms such as ‘equality’, ‘democracy’ and ‘justice’:
The semantic role of these terms is not to express any positive content but . . . to function as the 
names of a fullness which is constitutively absent. It is because there is no human situation in 
which injustice of some kind or another does not exist that ‘justice’, as a term, makes sense. 
Since it names an undifferentiated fullness, it has no conceptual content whatsoever: it is not an 
abstract term but [is], in the strictest sense, empty. A discussion of whether a just society will 
be brought about by a fascist or by a socialist order does not proceed as logical deduction 
starting from a concept of ‘justice’ accepted by the two sides, but through a radical investment 
whose discursive steps are not logico-conceptual connections but attributive-performative 
ones. (Laclau, 2005: 96–7)
Contrary to Laclau’s assertions, from the field of narrative theory, Caracciolo has exten-
sively proved that ‘expression’ is ‘a double-sided concept: it ties together the subject’s 
experience (which is expressed) with the experiential background of other subjects (who 
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interpret an utterance as an expression)’ (2014: 37). In other words, Laclau’s alleged 
emptiness of certain categories is a misconception. Inversely, the action of expression 
together with the semantic charge of any given term ultimately relies on the cognitive, 
the experiential and the relational configurations which emerge from pre-figurative 
poetic acts and historical realizations.5 The meaning of a term is a net of symbolic expec-
tations in the making. It is never empty, but is instead always a negotiation between 
probabilities and symbolic expectations.
Why metaphors?
My main focus on metaphors has two primary reasons: first, space constraints prevent 
extensive discussion of other meaning-processing mechanisms in this article; and, sec-
ondly, metaphors boast unique transformative possibilities for social mobilization and 
change. In this regard, I leave detailed examination of the three other cognitive rhetorical 
operations – metonymy, synecdoche and irony – for further research.
A metaphor is not only a linguistic device. It is also a cognitive operation that config-
ures and shapes the pre-figurative poetic act which articulates our worldviews. Metaphors 
can be verbal or non-verbal, embodied or unembodied, incremental or revolutionary. 
They hold the potential for re-signifying a given information process. Thus, the study of 
metaphors provides a tool for identifying underlying sets of practices, attitudes, beliefs, 
aesthetics and ethical values which configure the citizens’ ideological and moral matrix. 
As explained by Gibbs (2017a: 264):
The original proposal that metaphor was part of our ordinary conceptual system was never 
intended to dismiss the historical, cultural, social, and aesthetic dimensions of metaphorical 
experience. . . . Metaphor is not just a linguistic device, and has many roots in pervasive patterns 
of cognitive and embodied activity.
In this vein, it is my working hypothesis that by studying the metaphorical systematicity 
produced within certain imagined communities, it is possible to ground the conceptual 
system that informs cultural and political practices such as populist movements, while 
also tracing novel metaphors that can activate renewal and produce structural change in 
our societies.
The 2008 financial crisis produced structural change in almost every stratum of 
Europe’s social fabric. In other words, it triggered the downfall of the set of cultural, 
political and institutional values taken for granted prior to 2008. The resulting cultural 
and political configurations evolved from a context of unprecedented social instability in 
Europe. Wodak defines the new context as a ‘politics of fear’:
Currently, we observe a normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, which primarily works with ‘fear’: fear of change, of globalization, of loss of welfare, of 
climate change, of changing gender roles; in principle, almost anything can be constructed as a 
threat to ‘Us’, an imagined homogeneous people inside a well-protected territory. (2016: 114)
Such processes, I argue (Valdivia, 2017; Valdivia et al., 2017), emerge as the fictional 
engendering of different sets and configurations of the citizen’s ideological and moral 
grid operating in a given cultural narrative.
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In a recent study from the field of Communication Studies, Burgers (2016) has noted 
that ‘metaphors are commonly used in communication, as approximately 16.4 per cent 
of words in written news, 7.7 per cent in interpersonal conversations, and 18.5 per cent 
of words in academic texts are metaphoric.’ Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to 
prove, in Burgers’ words, that:
metaphors provide frames of thinking about societal topics, by highlighting particular aspects 
of the target [domain] while obscuring others. Because frames of thinking about the old 
situation shift in the context of change, focusing on the metaphors through which these frames 
of thinking are expressed in language is an efficient way to model change in communication. 
(Burgers, 2016)
Therefore, analysis of the pervasiveness of metaphoricity in a given cultural narrative is 
key to understanding the confluence of factors which intervene in the creation of alterna-
tive cultural and political imaginaries and, thus, social change. As stated by Gibbs 
(2017a), ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory is not a complete theory of how language is 
understood, because conceptual metaphorical knowledge must be complemented by a 
diversity of other linguistic, cognitive, and social-cultural processes’. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, 1980b; Lakoff, 1990, 1993, in Howe, 2006: 80): ‘Our meta-
phor system is central to our understanding of experience and to the way we act on that 
understanding’. From my perspective, such ‘understanding of experience’ is deeply con-
nected to the fictional narrativization of space, time and self-referential expression. We 
are the fictions we engage with and which are hierarchically operated under multi-direc-
tional and multi-layered forces.
According to the research developed by Casasanto, ‘although initial evidence for 
metaphor theory was based on descriptive analyses of how people talk, there is now 
abundant experimental evidence that people also think metaphorically – even when they 
are not using any metaphorical language’ (2017: 46). Addressing fundamental questions 
such as ‘Where do our mental metaphors come from?’ ‘Does everyone use the same 
mental metaphors, at least when they are thinking about universal experiences like the 
passage of time?’ ‘Once established, do our basic mental metaphors ever change?’ has 
led Casasanto to sketch what he defines as a ‘Hierarchical Mental Metaphors Theory’: an 
instrument to understand ‘common mechanisms by which our mental metaphors are 
shaped [through] language-specific, culture-specific, or body-specific patterns of experi-
ence’ as well as ‘the origins of our thoughts, the extent of cognitive diversity, and the 
dynamism of our mental lives’ (2017: 60–1).
In this regard, by following Kövecses’ work (2010), Winter and Matlock (2017: 110) 
have noted that ‘cultural representations of metaphors (understood broadly as including 
artefacts, gesture and linguistic expressions) feed back into the cognitive systems at the 
individual level’. This is to say that metaphors ‘underlying conceptual systems (the indi-
vidual level) lead to cultural representations (supra-individual), but that the connection 
between individuals and representations is a two-way street’. Gibbs (2017b: 167) 
explains it is possible to study metaphoricity in thought if
we no longer simply see conceptual metaphors as purely cognitive entities. Instead, conceptual 
metaphorical thinking emerges from a complex interaction of forces, ranging from history and 
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culture to cognition and neural activities. Conceptual metaphors specifically incorporate rich 
socio-cultural, embodied knowledge that shapes people’s sensitive, in-the-moment metaphorical 
actions.
I suggest that such hierarchical configurations of metaphors, which carry a two-way 
symbolic capital under the tension and interaction of forces, produce ‘regimes of meta-
phor’, where sets of hierarchies are privileged, activated and made visible to the detri-
ment of other sets of metaphor whose symbolic capital becomes underrepresented in a 
given cultural narrative.
Cultural narratives of crisis and populism in Southern 
Europe
What is a cultural narrative?
Due to the absence of a comprehensive definition of the term ‘cultural narrative’,6 I pro-
pose here a tentative understanding of the concept as the moral and aesthetic coded 
symbolic matrix-in-the-making which orientates behaviour and signifies the imaginary 
relationship between an individual (and/or [virtual] community) and her (his/their) 
material conditions of existence in a given historical-spatial context. In short, a ‘cultural 
narrative’ is a sort of ‘dark matter’ that establishes the cognitive and performative 
grounds of social interactions, attachments, expectations, rationalities and modes of 
becoming.7 Cultural narratives operate as cognitive and performative thresholds. They 
create meaning and orientate behaviour in multi-directional ways. Cultural narratives 
share an essential property attributed to the notion of a process in the theory of mind: ‘a 
relatively permanent form or pattern displayed by continuously changing processes, just 
as a wave maintains its form although it is constituted by different volumes of water at 
different times’ (Blackburn, 2016).
Crisis? What crisis?
Another key term that requires critical clarification is ‘crisis’. This notion comes from the 
Greek verb krinein and its etymology encompasses notions of ‘separating’ and ‘deciding’, 
with roots in medical discourse which are associated with a turning point in disease after 
which a patient is either destined to die or will proceed to recovery (Bauman and Bordoni, 
2014). Currently, it implies a moment of rupture and instability, as exemplified by the 
2008 financial crisis and the ongoing refugee crisis (Sassen, 2014). Crises always involve 
turbulence and discontent but also rethinking and innovation. They generate new ways of 
analysing and engaging with the past and present, while opening paths to the articulation 
of possible futures that can challenge traditional ideas (Cardoso and Jacobetty, 2012). 
From an institutional perspective, the study of Europe’s recent crises has been key for the 
implementation of social and political practices that will enhance a new narrative for 
Europe as manifested by the European Commission’s White Paper on the Future of 
Europe and the Way Forward (2017). In the words of Castells et al. (2018: 428–30), 
‘Europe’s crisis is a crisis of its own making . . . Europe’s crises are therefore part of a 
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cumulative process that is strong enough to challenge the core institutions of the European 
Union, institutions that are already threatened by a growing lack of legitimacy.’
Is it possible to define populism?
Populism is a contested term. According to Mudde and Rovira (2017: 6), it can be defined 
as a ‘thin-centered ideology for understanding the oft-alleged malleability of the concept 
in question . . . In fact, populism almost always appears attached to other ideological ele-
ments, which are crucial for the promotion of political projects that are appealing to a 
broader public.’ In this vein, Müller approaches the term as a ‘particular moralistic imag-
ination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and 
fully unified – . . . ultimately fictional – people against elites who are deemed corrupt or 
in some other way morally inferior’ (2016: 26). Although recent years have witnessed 
increasing numbers of scholarly articles on right-wing populist movements (Mudde, 
2017), there is not sufficient scientific research on the challenges that populism poses in 
connection to human rights and democratic cultural narratives in Southern Europe. As 
argued by Alston (2017: 1), ‘The nationalistic, xenophobic, misogynistic, and explicitly 
anti-human rights agenda of many populist political leaders requires human rights pro-
ponents to rethink many longstanding assumptions.’ Consequently, regarding the field of 
cultural production, there is also an urgent necessity to analyse the cultural features that 
play a decisive role in the construction of the populist narratives within the current 
European public spheres.
As Betz suggests (2016: 348), ‘The rise and success of radical . . . populism in western 
Europe can . . . be interpreted as the result of the increasing social and cultural fragmen-
tation and differentiation of advanced Western societies.’ In his words, these processes 
are closely connected to an overarching development involving the general individuali-
zation mechanisms unfolding in post-industrial societies. This development is ‘gradually 
destroying the bases of the great all-encompassing projects of modern politics’ (2016: 
346). Betz also notes that:
in a social, cultural, and political climate characterized by fluidity and insecurity, radical . . . 
populism appeals to the new egocentrism which prevails throughout the advanced Western 
world and which finds expression as much in the picture of the ‘fortress Europe’ and the 
renewed outbursts of nationalist separatism as in the hostility towards foreigners and the 
denunciation of the welfare state. If this is correct, the radical . . . populist parties are symptoms 
as well as . . . by-products of the general turbulence of the present age. (2016: 346)
Subsequently, I argue that the centrality of a metaphor such as ‘fortress Europe’ is the 
result of a displacement or obscuring of other cognitive representations of the European 
Union, such as the depiction of it as a building or a family, within newly articulated 
regimes of metaphors. These shifts have been triggered by major changes and unfolding 
events following the 2008 financial crisis and the refugee crisis and their aftermaths, 
together with the emergence of populist narratives that have responded to and/or engaged 
with a context of unprecedented instability which has put into question the pre-2008 
mindset. As argued by Castells et al. (2012) and Crosthwaite (2012), crises are ‘symbolic 
Valdivia 289
crises’. In my view, ‘populism’ is both a symptom and an attitude. Its genuine power of 
attraction lies not only in its ideological capability to activate a regular citizen as populist, 
but also the cultural and aesthetic psycho-emotional rewards it presents: belonging to a 
group; the fictionalization and centrality of the citizen as hero in the social narrative; 
affect compensation; and a foundation in an apparently non-mutable storytelling, among 
others.8 This fictional mode of becoming is being triggered mainly by social and news 
media channels. In line with this reasoning, Cardoso et al. (2018: 424–5) have argued that:
Networked autonomy of individuals can be argued as a new modality of power. Social media 
becomes an integral organizational part of contemporary social movements, allowing flexibility 
across various conditions, issues and scale, and, through the formative element of ‘sharing’, 
enables individualized public engagement and personalized collective action formations . . . 
Social media, and ICT’s in general, constitute themselves as the elected tools that strengthen 
ties between individuals within political protest, but they have not been particularly good at 
connecting political institutions and individuals.
Indeed, most European institutions are lagging politically behind the new configura-
tions brought about by a new set of social and power relations where ‘networked indi-
viduals are the message’ (Cardoso et al., 2018: 424–5). In this novel era, discontent has 
mutated into new political attitudes where ‘people seem to increasingly think about 
social liaisons, institutions, power, social transformation and autonomy as based in net-
works’ (Cardoso et al., 2018: 424–5). According to Cardoso et al., this phenomenon 
represents ‘the fundamental novelty brought by new media to social mobilization in 
regions like Southern Europe’ and it ‘is something that new political parties that rose or 
shared momentum with the protests against austerity, such as M5S, Syriza or Podemos, 
have understood and incorporated into their political practices’ (2018: 424–5). In short, 
the post-2008 European context needs new conceptualizations to relatively old prob-
lems. Therefore, in this article, I understand populism to be a mode of becoming active 
in the social fabric and not as a state or a political premise. Any of us can potentially be 
a populist, but the open questions are: what activates citizens as populists? Which fac-
tors intervene in the process (economic, inter-generational, political, economic, psycho-
logical, emotional, linguistic and so on)? And how decisive are regional, cultural and 
spatial factors?
What is Southern Europe?
In consonance with Castells et al. (2012), ‘the crisis of global capitalism that has unfolded 
since 2008 is not merely economic. It is structural and multi-dimensional. The events 
that took place in its immediate aftermath show that we are entering a world with very 
different social and economic conditions from those that characterized the rise of global, 
informational capitalism in the preceding three decades’ (2012: 1). Thus, in the context 
of the 2008 financial and later refugee crises, individuals and communities have gener-
ated cultural representations and intellectual responses to challenging situations. In 
Southern European countries, including Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, the financial 
and refugee crises have led to a fundamental rethinking of democratic, social and cultural 
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values. The crises have fostered new social and cultural forces, and even political parties, 
as has occurred in Portugal with the Bloco de Esquerda, in Greece with Syriza, in Spain 
with Ciudadanos and Podemos, and in Italy with La Sinistra-L’Arcobaleno, Lega Nord 
or Movimento 5 Stelle (see Castells et al., 2018).
Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy shared the heavy financial and social impacts of the 
2008 financial crisis; they are all coastal areas of Southern Europe that are exposed to the 
flow of refugees, migration and inter-cultural border conflicts; they face increasingly 
transnational challenges in policy-making under the framework of the European Union, 
and they share high levels of economic inequality (Piketty, 2018). These countries also 
show the highest growth in inequality of income distribution (alongside Eastern European 
countries) according to the latest data on the Gini coefficient published by Eurostat in 
2015 (Portugal: 34; Greece: 34.2; Spain: 34.6; Italy: 32.4). In this context, national pro-
test movements have gained visibility and have given rise to cooperative and solidarity-
based organizations. This visibility and cooperation are accompanied by intense cultural 
production and social renewal, reflecting a growing anti-European political unrest 
(Flesher-Fominaya and Cox, 2013). Such unrest has given birth to the oppositional but 
paradoxically close poles of left- and right-wing populism, which share nativist princi-
ples while differing on certain political issues such as migration policy and the re-distri-
bution of wealth. However, both attitudes coincide in their vindication of nationalism 
and national identity as a common denominator for social organization, political and 
economic protectionism, and anti-European attitudes. Both cultural and political trends 
follow a similar narrative mechanism: they identify an idyllic pre-political state based on 
the nation-state metaphor where social welfare is fictionally assured. These socio-politi-
cal movements articulate their agendas around the imperative of giving back control of 
their lives to the ‘people’ which they define against any ‘other’ that might prevent them 
from successfully accomplishing it. As stated by Castells et al. (2018: 191):
For a small minority of Europeans, largely members of social and economic elites, the EU is a 
cosmopolitan project in which transnational and transboundary relationships are only likely to 
grow. For many others, instead, it is linked to processes of globalization and marketization that 
have largely excluded them.
In a reductionistic equation, according to populist supporters, cosmopolitanism is equiv-
alent to the evil of neoliberal practices. In practice, a theology of the nation-state meta-
phor replaces the principles of universal human rights or, so to speak, human rights only 
become valid within the borders of the cultural and political imaginaries of the national-
ist narrative.
Consequently, we face an exceptional new economic, cultural and social paradigm, 
which is multi-directional as well as multi-dimensional due to its cross-class implica-
tions (Bauman and Bordoni, 2014; Milanovic, 2016). The polyhedral nature of the finan-
cial and refugee crises and their aftermaths challenges our traditional narrative of the 
nation-state and thus forces us to reconsider our standard notion of national culture as 
declared by the European Commission under the New Narrative for Europe project 
(2014). These challenges urge us to rethink the limits of European national cultures by 
changing our scope to a transnational reality where technological innovations engender 
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a new social structure based on different information networking (Castells et al., 2012). 
Southern Europe is a socially, culturally and geographically diverse entity, but also an 
advanced laboratory for social engineering where the future of the European Union is 
compromised.
Regimes of metaphor
To summarize my line of thought so far, I argue that there are four main factors that have 
intervened in the configuration of the post-2008 crises and the rise of populist in our 
societies: (1) a clear socio-emotional turn in political discourse; (2) a cultural rhetoric 
which appeals to the confrontation between the Eros (in a Lacanian sense) of the discus-
sion and pragmatism of the compromise where actors in social media do not seek com-
mon ground but an emotional reward in conflict-making itself; (3) a pervasive cultural 
hegemony of the economic metaphor; and (4) an institutional blind spot created by 
attempting to tackle societal challenges through looking only at social, political and eco-
nomic issues, and not paying sufficient attention to the implications of social mobiliza-
tion under new cultural networks of meaning production and processing.
Burgers (2016) has convincingly explained that social change and metaphor produc-
tion are interrelated. A good example of what he defines as incremental change can be 
found in the foundational metaphor of ‘laying the foundations of the EU’ which contrib-
uted to establishing the principles of the European Union in the post-war period. A good 
example of what he terms ‘fundamental change’ could be traced in the cognitive, and 
therefore cultural and political, informational processing of the metaphor ‘Europe is a 
building’ to another one commonly present at institutional discourse, ‘Europe is a family’ 
(see Figure 1).
According to Burgers, a metaphor can be exhausted and/or normalized when it 
becomes a conventional metaphor. In this regard, his theoretical approach builds on the 
research carried out by Lakoff and Johnson (1980b) about ‘primary metaphor’, and the 
notion of ‘unconventional metaphors’ as conceptualized by Gibbs (2017a) and Kövacses 
(2010) (Figure 2).
This scheme helps in the understanding of the scientific contributions and debates 
from the initial conceptualization of ‘primary metaphors’ to the latest findings connected 
to what Andreas Musolff (2006, 2008, 2012, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017) has brilliantly 
problematized as ‘metaphor scenarios’, which are the ‘organization of source concepts 
into mini-narratives or “scenarios” that dominate the discourse manifestations of source 
domains’. Musolff provides examples of this by using a corpus of British and German 
public debates on the European Union. Complementing this approach, Zaiotti has applied 
the term ‘pragmatic metaphors’ (2008) to metaphors such as the ‘Schengen laboratory’ 
when studying the political and cultural framing of European Union law-making. In my 
view, Zaiotti’s ‘pragmatic metaphors’ provide good examples of Musolff’s ‘metaphor 
scenarios’,9 as they
help members of a community find a reasonable way to justify the undertaking of practices that 
break with what is the prevailing norm. As special types of cognitive ‘mirrors’, they illuminate 
the yet unexplored path actors wish to undertake and thus support their ‘commute’ between the 
existing and the potential new commonsense. (Zaiotti, 2008: 68)
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The disciplinary development of the study of metaphors from Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (Lakoff and Turner) to Critical Metaphor Theory (Musolff) has been rich and 
enlightening for two reasons: (a) it has proved that constructing worldviews and deci-
sion-making are part of complex processes and not by-products of ideological causal-
ity; (b) it has provided a more solid and scientific grounding for metaphor studies in 
methodological terms, thanks to new data-processing tools and interpretative commu-
nities, transforming what, in the past, was a product of subjective impressionistic 
critique.
In this regard, I would like to contribute to the ongoing debate on metaphoricity and 
social mobilization by filling a gap that I believe to exist between the cognitive-perform-
ative agency level of the ‘cultural narrative’ (where social interactions, attachments, 
Figure 1. Fundamental change in cognitive processing of the metaphor ‘Europe is a building’.  
© Pablo Valdivia.
Figure 2. Conceptual metaphor theoretical building: from primary metaphors to metaphor 
scenarios. © Pablo Valdivia.
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expectations, rationalities and modes of becoming take place) and the brilliant contribu-
tion made by Andreas Musolff on ‘metaphor scenarios’ at the level of metaphor meaning 
processing. I agree that source concepts are organized into mini-narratives (scenarios). 
Building on this idea, I suggest that there is a not sufficiently problematized upper level 
above the metaphor scenario (e.g. the ‘Schengen laboratory’) but prior to the configura-
tion of the cultural narrative (i.e. populism). In this meaning processing level there is a key 
intermediate cognitive operation where metaphors are narratively enacted, made visible 
and experienced. This is what I call the ‘regime’ level.
I will use an accessible policy-making document belonging to institutional dis-
course in order to illustrate what I have explained so far: the European Commission’s 
White Paper on the Future of Europe and the Way Forward (2017). This document was 
presented to the European Commission on 1 March 2017. Its aim was to open a debate 
and foster critical reflection on the goals of the European Union for 2025. The second 
half of the title, ‘the way forward’, is telling of the metaphorical frame that the concep-
tual grounding of the document relies on. Terms such as ‘drivers’, ‘carrying on’, 
‘accelerating’, ‘continue to’ and ‘moving on’, among other examples, are predominant 
in the document. This is especially evident in one of the five possible scenarios the 
document contemplates, entitled ‘those who want more do more’, where ‘carrying on’ 
(as a vanguard or leading group) is one of the most privileged notions. In short, the 
document operates conceptually according to metaphors of motion, as indicated by the 
title. In my view, a given regime of metaphors operates within a feedback loop of 
meaning processing which, in the case of the White Paper, can tentatively be summa-
rized as in Figure 3.
My modest contribution to the current scientific debate is to acknowledge how a 
regime of metaphors establishes a hierarchy of conceptual frames which articulate the 
conditions of possibility of a given cultural narrative. If we take the example above, the 
privileged primary metaphor of ‘Europe is Motion’ engenders certain expectations of 
meaning that foster particular, and no other, (un)conventional metaphors which further 
articulate a specific mini-narrative or scenario (progress). Once the mini-narrative or 
scenario is articulated, then a specific regime becomes active by obscuring other possible 
(or probabilistic) regimes. After the regime is active and visible, it enacts the configura-
tion of a cultural narrative (which I call a narrative because it comes from the action of 
narrative enacting) as a mode of becoming.
If we accept my conceptualization of the regime(s) of metaphor as a plausible mode 
of processing meaning, then some urgent questions should be addressed: how and why 
do these regimes of metaphor emerge? How do they become active? How and why is a 
particular regime privileged and hegemonic before others? How do cultural narratives 
absorb, produce, transform, consume and disseminate regimes of metaphors? How do 
regimes inform policy and decision-making in the institutional sphere? Why are some 
regimes possible only in particular historical contexts and not others? From my perspec-
tive, these questions can only be answered by problematizing what an interpretative 
community is in the age of informational networks. If we accept the definition of ‘regime’ 
as a particular way of operating or organizing something, then it is key to analysing the 
hierarchical tensions which take place in the cultural and performative thresholds of 
processing meaning.
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Therefore, it is my understanding that the populist modes of becoming active in 
Europe after the 2008 financial crisis and the refugee crisis have gained momentum and 
support through a confluence of different factors, including, fundamentally, the activa-
tion and rise of regime(s) of metaphor. In this regard, we face a turbulent moment where 
certain regimes of metaphor, the postwar conceptual configuration of the European 
Union, is collapsing and being challenged by a new one.
While the postwar metaphorical configuration orbited around conceptualizations 
assembled in the fashion of the following collapsing regime: ‘European Union is a 
Building’; ‘European Union is a Family’; ‘State Members as Friends’; ‘European Union 
as Equilibrium’; European Union as an Alliance’; currently, the European Union is being 
challenged by a populist-nativist and nationalist metaphorical configuration under the 
new rising regime of metaphor:10 ‘European Union as Corrupted Body’; ‘European 
Union as Panopticon’; ‘State Members as Rivals’; ‘European Union as Imbalance’; and 
‘European Union as Company’.
Perhaps, as I suggested at the beginning of this essay, the metaphor of ‘fortress 
Europe’ epitomizes the cultural and political crossroads we currently encounter, where 
Figure 3. General scheme regime of metaphor theory applied to the European White Paper on 
the Future of Europe and the Way Forward. © Pablo Valdivia.
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the cultural narrative of populism activates European citizens as anti-European, and the 
postwar regime of metaphor is being exhausted, lacking narrative legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the post-2008 crises. Thus, I would like to argue that new regimes of meta-
phor based on equity and inclusion are urgently needed if democratic systems do not 
wish to see the social fabric eroded and if they hope to renew the goal of creating 
all-encompassing cultural and political projects. As Castells et al. (2018: 192) note:
Indeed, it is my hypothesis that it is in the realm of values, of new values, where we could find 
the seeds of a potential European identity. On the basis of surveys and attitudes, and a review 
of the literature, I have identified some elements of what I have called a ‘European identity 
project’. This is what appears empirically to possibly carry a broad cultural consensus 
throughout Europe, besides the values of political democracy and liberty in all its manifestations 
(which are widely shared values, but not distinctively European). These elements can be 
identified as shared feelings concerning the need for universal social protection of living 
conditions; social solidarity; stable employment; worker’s rights; gender equality; universal 
human rights, including gay and lesbian rights; concern about poor people around the world; 
extension of democracy to regional and local levels, with a renewed emphasis on citizen 
participation; the defence of historically rooted cultures, often expressed in linguistic terms.
I find Castell’s proposal for a European identity project very valuable, as I have shown 
that the material conditions of existence are cognitively and performatively experienced, 
enacting specific configurations of modes of becoming as cultural narratives. In this 
sense, I argue that cultural narratives (and their metaphoricity) are key to understanding 
the mechanisms that ‘transform . . . a group of like-minded people into a motivated, 
mobilized tribe’ (Barlett, 2018: 47), and how people can be activated through ‘a sense of 
shared struggle and common grievance’ (2018: 48).
Conclusions: cultural thresholds
I began this article by posing two urgent questions: (1) why, in moments of crisis, do 
particular metaphors operate in the construction of interrelated cultural narratives?; and 
(2) in what ways do metaphors generate alternative intellectual horizons for social 
renewal, particularly in response to the Southern European rise of populism? In response 
to the first question, I have sufficiently demonstrated that specific metaphors become 
active through the conjunction of crises because of their cognitive and performative rela-
tional abilities during the pre-figurative poetic act of processing meaning. Contrary to the 
arguments of Laclau, I have explained that metaphors are narratively enacted. This is to 
say that terms such as ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ or ‘progress’ are not empty, and configure 
modes of becoming in the public sphere when certain potential conceptual expectations, 
and not others, are made visible, privileged and activated in a given cultural narrative. 
Therefore, signifiers are not hollow but the result of a complex metaphoricity tension in 
the interrelated informational meaning processing of cultural narratives. I must insist on 
the fact that the experientiality of narrative cannot be neglected.
In answer to the second question, I have proposed an analytical approach which builds 
on previous findings from Conceptual Metaphor and Critical Metaphor Theory. My anal-
ysis suggests that metaphors function under regimes, which become visible through 
296 Journal of European Studies 49(3–4)
relational counter-tension with other regimes that have become exhausted, naturalized or 
which are simply losing legitimacy. Out of the four rhetorical devices which operate in 
pre-figurative poetic acts – metonymy, synecdoche, irony and metaphor – the last is 
especially relevant because of its pervasive presence in communication and its creative 
ability to establish mini-narratives that re-signify source concepts. In the context of 
Southern Europe, where the effects of the post-2008 European crises were especially 
critical, new political parties supporting populist, nativist and nationalist positions have 
re-signified the cultural imaginary of the nation-state in opposition to European cosmo-
politanism. In Barlett’s words: ‘We are living, as McLuhan predicted, through a re-trib-
alization of politics’ (2018: 43). This is exemplified by the rise to power of Podemos, 
Lega Nord or Movimento 5 Stelle. In this regard, populism has been successful at creat-
ing an alternative cultural horizon for social renewal by activating and making visible a 
rising regime of fundamentally anti-European metaphors.
Finally, there are three points I would like to conclude with: (1) populism is not an 
ideology but a mode of becoming (an attitude) in a cultural narrative. Accordingly, any 
citizen has the potential to become populist under the right regime of metaphor and the 
experiential enacting of a shared cultural imaginary. This explains why non-factual polit-
ical positions gain widespread acceptance, misinformation has become a strategy to 
achieve a goal without risking being seen as morally blameless, and ‘post-truth’ has 
become a familiar term in institutional discourse. (2) Metaphors gain properties of social 
and political mobilization at the regime level, not before. Their potential for social 
change or renewal can only be further developed if they become narratively enacted and 
form part of a major cultural narrative. (3) Cultural narratives operate as thresholds. 
There is no causal unidirectionality from the cultural narrative to the public sphere or 
institutional discourse. This feature explains why a cultural narrative can simultaneously 
hold a position and its contrary. In other words, it explains why a model citizen might 
hold a specific political orientation in some matters while simultaneously becoming a 
populist nativist in others.
These conclusions lead me to affirm that the re-tribalization of the public sphere is 
feeding populism, while at the same time it fuels partisanship. It poses two concerning 
new questions that should be addressed in future lines of work: (1) If populism manages 
to theologically displace the notion of citizenship, does spectrality become the central 
characteristic of those who do not accommodate the populist cultural and legal frame-
work, i.e. are we on the narrative threshold of the legalization and cultural validation of 
xenophobia?; and (2) How long can a populist cultural narrative based on a post-ideolog-
ical utopia where tribal loyalty centrally articulates an imperative mode of becoming 
last? Perhaps, in order to answer these and other complex questions, we should look back 
to Hannah Arendt, who wrote that:
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but 
people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience) and the 
distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist. (1951: 474)
Literary scholars are experts in interpretative communities and the pre-figurative poetic 
acts that inform critical thinking. Humanities and new literary studies should now have a 
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leading role in the understanding of cultural narratives and the configurations of the 
social fabric.
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Notes
 1. In the field of neuroscience, Antonio Damasio (2018: 61) has noted the importance of cogni-
tive mechanisms in the configuration of decision-making:
The absence of mapping and image-making capabilities entails other fatal consequences: con-
sciousness cannot arise in the absence of minds, and the same applies, even more fundamen-
tally, to the very special class of processes called feelings, which are constituted by images 
closely interwoven with body operations . . . Why was having images so important? What did 
having images really accomplish? The presence of images meant that each organism could 
create internal representations based on its ongoing sensory descriptions of both external and 
internal events . . . Central processors manage the process of image manipulation that we 
otherwise know as thinking, imagining, reasoning and decision making.
 On the notion of ‘imagined communities’, see Anderson (1983)
 2. Pujante (2017: 48) has pointed out in his academic work the existence of this gap and the key 
role of cultural rhetoric in the formation of worldviews:
Language therefore formulates the realities with which we live and in which we believe, as 
well as those we enjoy. They are realities at various levels, which exist while their constructs 
are created: we can talk about Beethoven’s music and Cervantes’ Quixote as human con-
structs, but this also applies to all the discourses that interpret the world in the events related – 
both historical discourses and those concerning present and future possibility, because there 
is no possible distinction here between discourses for reality and discourses for fictionality.
 3. See Pujante (2017: 55):
According to White, the four basic tropes, or four possibilities of prefiguration (metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche and irony) are four types of awareness of the experience obtained 
from living. A linguistic process is what makes the contents of our experience (our cognition) 
conscious. Broadening this approach – which is an approach rooted in rhetoric – when engag-
ing in any rhetorical analysis of public discourse, what we have to seek is the relationship 
between elocutive structures and the inventio-dispositio, that is, the discovery of the ideas of 
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the discourse and its interpretative design of the part of the world that causes it. This inter-
pretation takes place through forms of language and gesture, and does so on several levels: 
primarily the narrative and the tropological. We certainly produce a plot (a narratio in rhetori-
cal discourse, a subject in literary narrative discourse) which explains events as we see them – 
this is the composition of our consciousness. However, according to White, and continuing 
the tradition of Vico, there is a poetic act of prefiguration of the historical discourse, a kind 
of infrastructure.
 4. In connection with the relationship between political expression and cognitive expressions, 
Damasio (2018: 26) has argued that the brain is ‘the organic basis of the capacity to learn and 
to manipulate symbols’.
 5. See Pujante (2017: 55):
There are four possible types of prefiguration, which are based on four basic tropes: metaphor 
(experience in object–object terms), metonymy (party–party), synecdoche (object–totality) 
and irony (denial of the assertion). These four tropes are four types of consciousness of the 
experience gained from living. We make our experiences (our knowledge) conscious through 
language. Tropes are the mechanisms that enable us to understand this process of conscious-
ness: the mechanisms of figural language. So when different historians consider the French 
Revolution, for example, they are faced with the same events, but historians offer us different 
ways of relating them, because they have different conceptions of nature, society, politics 
and history itself, which they convey with their figural characterizations of the whole. The 
narrative suggested by the historian does not therefore lie in the events, which are the same 
for everyone. Events are not inherently tragic, comic or satirical, with the latter understood as 
construction, as direction of meaning.
 6. For working definitions of the notions of ‘culture’ and ‘narrative’, see Damasio (2018: 14, 
91–2, 96–7).
 7. In this regard, see Damasio (2018: 97):
The constant search and sweep of our memories of past and future enable us, in effect, to 
intuit possible meanings of current situations and to predict the possible future, immediate 
and not so immediate, as life unfolds. It is reasonable to say that we live part of our lives in 
the anticipated future rather than in the present.
 8. Regarding the conceptual genealogy on these mechanisms, see Crouch (2018: 318–19):
As . . . some other observers have pointed out, the ‘universalism’ of the social democratic 
welfare state has almost always been a limited universe that stops at the national border, as it 
has been based on the powerful, egalitarian concept of national citizenship, rooted in people’s 
sense of shared membership in a national community. There has never been any reason why 
social democracy’s voters, as opposed to its thinkers, should have cosmopolitan attitudes. The 
idea is expressed most clearly in the Swedish concept of the welfare state as folkshemmet, 
the place where people can feel at home . . . To assert the limitation of social citizenship to 
‘real’ nationals now can no longer be the folkshem of a people who just happen to be ethni-
cally homogeneous, but becomes symbolized by the demand of the Front National that rights 
be limited to français de la souche (best translated broadly as ‘true born French’), requiring 
active exclusion of those deemed to be outsiders.
 9. Similar terms, but not exactly the same, have been proposed by Gibb’s conceptualiza-
tion of ‘dynamic metaphors’ and Ritchie’s ‘story metaphors’ (2017). I acknowledge their 
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contributions to the ongoing debate about metaphoricity. I also find these contributors useful 
as they all attempt to articulate a better understanding of how metaphors interrelate with dis-
course-making and social factors. Unfortunately, I cannot provide an overview and genealogy 
of the terms here, but I invite the reader to pay attention to different academic conceptualiza-
tions of the same research problems by reviewing the references at the end of this article.
10. A general look at institutional discourse posed by Southern European politicians illustrates 
the pervasiveness of the metaphors included here. For more information, see Castells et al. 
(2018).
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